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Moreover, all of these forms must be properly filled in and properly
executed. If they are filled in by a lay grantor without the help of a lawyer-
as Mr. Dacey invites his readers to do 20-there is obviously danger of defective
execution, and while these forms may not be held to be testamentary documents
by the courts, they share with wills one unfortunate characteristic: defects tend
to show up when it is too late to correct them. Mr. Dacey pooh-poohs this objec-
tion and says lawyers make mistakes too, but it is to be feared that the com-
bination of a sophisticated form and a lay draftsman will produce an unin-
tended result-if not outright invalidity-more often than Mr. Dacey thinks.
This book will disappear from the best-seller lists, but we can expect its
forms to begin turning up in our courts in the near future, and to continue
there for some years to come. Whatever their theoretical validity, it is certainly
predictable that they will be a source of extensive-and expensive-litigation,
which may one day bring lawyers to lift their voices in a paraphrase of the
old toast:
"To the probate avoider, let's drink to his dust,
Who for four ninety-five makes his own Dacey Trust."
GEORGE M. Z1mmERmANN
Member, New York Bar
Lecturer, State University of New
York at Buffalo, School of Law
INSiDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MAcT. By Henry G. Manne. New York:
The Free Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 274. $6.95.
The action commenced by the S.E.C. in 1965 against Texas Gulf Sulfur
Company and certain of its directors, officers and employees' has caused a great
concern and uncertainty with regard to the legality and liability of corporate
insiders, i.e. directors, officers and employees and others, trading in a corpora-
tion's shares when they are in possession of information not generally available
to the investing public.
declaration of trust will not alter in the slightest degree your right to do with them as you
wish during your lifetime."
20. He does concede that a lawyer may be needed to amend an existing trust, but "if
he's worth his salt, it's not more than a twenty-minute job." P. 242.
1. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This case is
concerned with trading in the corporation's stock by insiders prior to public disclosure of
a substantial ore find in the Trimmins Ontario area. The S.E.C. complaint was based on
Rule 10b-5 and requested injunctive relief, rescission and restitution. The lower court deci-
sion, which has been appealed, accepted a limited part of the S.E.C.'s contention as to
insider liability, held substantially against the SE.C.'s position on the facts and dismissed
the action against the company and ten or twelve individual defendants. This decision did
not deal with questions concorping the remedies to be applied to the two defendants found
in violation,
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Prior to Texas Gulf Sulfur, restrictions on insider trading were of three
classes. First, the majority common law rule. This rule requires a special rela-
tionship between the insider and the outsider indicating a substantial danger
of fraud before insider liability for trading will be imposed. Second, the "Short
Swing Profits" rule under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
This rule requires that all profits derived by purchases or sales by an insider
within a six-month period be turned over to the corporation. Third, the law
developed under Rule 10b-5. This rule, which deals with fraudulent practices
in the sale of securities was judicially extended to apply to some insider trading
situations even prior to Texas Gulf Sulfur. The relief requested by the S.E.C.
in Texas Gulf Sulfur greatly exceeded any relief previously granted on the basis
of 10b-5. Even the limited relief granted by the trial court extends the limits
of liability for insider trading.
Most of the comment and discussion resulting from this case has been
concerned with the extent of the prohibition against insider trading, the liability
of insiders for trading and the remedies available to the S.E.C. and the investing
public in the event of trading by insiders. The case has not resulted in any sub-
stantial reanalysis of the basic reasons why insider trading should or should not
be discouraged. Professor Manne suggests that such a reanalysis should be
undertaken. He concludes that insider trading causes no substantial harm to the
investing public, the corporations involved or to any other party having an inter-
est in the matter; that the potential rewards of such insider trading are an
appropriate form of compensation for entrepreneurial activities on the part of
corporate insiders; and that there exist no valid reasons why such insider trad-
ing and the associated profits should not be held to be socially and legally
acceptable.
After discussing the current state of the law, the author analyzes hypotheti-
cally the market effect of insider trading on the basis of undisclosed information.
He concludes that such trading has no effect upon the long term investor in a
corporate security. He admits that there may be some effect of such trading on
the profits of a short term trader but concludes that there is nothing socially un-
desirable from this effect. He next analyzes his concept of the functions and com-
pensations of the capitalist, the manager and entrepreneur in a corporate busi-
ness. The capitalist invests in a business and receives interest as compensation
for his investment. The manager performs the function of operating the existing
business of a corporation in an orderly and profitable manner, and receives
a salary-as compensation for his service. The function of both the capitalist and
the manager are static. The entrepreneur's function, on the other hand, is
dynamic. He innovates and creates new entities, combinations, approaches, prod-
ucts and methods which are essential to competition and growth of a business
and the economy in general. The functions of the capitalist, the manager and
the entrepreneur, or any two of them, may be performed by the same individual
but the traditional forms of compensation do not adequately compensate for
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entrepreneurial activity. To reach this conclusion the author analyzes salaries,
bonuses, bonus plans and stock options and finds each of them lacking.
The last form of compensation considered is that of profits derived from
trading on the basis of information obtained as an insider. These profits are
not dependent upon or related to the amount of investment of the insider in
the corporation but are generally related to the activity of the corporation
resulting from the entrepreneurial activities of its executives. Permitting insiders
to make these profits makes it possible for corporations to induce able men with
entrepreneurial inclination to serve as directors and executives. For these reasons
the author feels that insider trading is an appropriate and desirable means of
providing additional compensation to insiders who are the entrepreneurs of the
corporations.
The two drawbacks to the author's approach which immediately come to
mind are: first, that permitting insiders to trade on the basis of undisclosed
information may cause an increase in manipulation in the disclosure of informa-
tion and in trading; and second, a rule which permits unrestricted insider trad-
ing would not insure that the entrepreneurs who have contributed to the cor-
porate growth and activity would be the parties who derive benefit from the
insider trading. The author attempts to answer these two criticisms. His an-
swers, however, are not completely convincing.
After discussing the criticism of his proposal, the author considers the
means and effects of enforcement of rules prohibiting or restricting insider trad-
ing by the government and individual corporations. His conclusion is that such
enforcement is generally ineffective and has many undesirable side effects. Thus
based upon his premises that inside trading does not substantially hurt the in-
vesting public, that trading profits derived from insider trading based on inside
information is an appropriate form of entrepreneurial compensation and that an
effective means of enforcing prohibitions on insider trading is difficult if not
impossible to devise and operate, Mr. Manne concludes that such trading should
be permitted and accepted.
The book contains an additional discussion relating to the problems created
by trading by government officials and employees on the basis of inside informa-
tion which they have obtained in their official capacities. It analyzes the various
situations in which such information is obtained, and the existing and proposed
recommendations for controlling trading by government officials and employees
on the basis of such information. It is Professor Manne's opinion that such
trading cannot be justified upon the same grounds upon which insider trading
by corporate officials can be justified. The same conclusions as to lack of harm
to other investors and the difficulty of enforcement apply, but there is no justifi-
cation for such profits going to governmental officials and employees. For this
reason the author recommends that regulations or legislation be adopted to
prohibit or restrict such trading by governmental officials or employees.
Whether one agrees with and accepts all or any part of the author's con-
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clusions, the book causes one to agree with his initial assertion, i.e. that a
thorough re-examination of the justification, problems and effects of insider
trading on the basis of undisclosed information should be undertaken. If such
a re-examination is undertaken, it is hoped that adoption of better legislation
or regulations relating to the problem will result.
As a technical matter this book is well-written. It contains footnotes to
supplement and amplify its points and conclusions, as well as the text of the
principal cases referred to in the section dealing with the existing law in the
area. The book should be of interest to any student of American corporations
and to any practitioner who has frequent or occasional contact with the prob-
lems confronting publicly held corporations.
ALAN H. VooT
Member, New York Bar
A SIGN FoR CAIN. By Frederick Wertham, M.D. An Exploration Of Human
Violence. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 391. $6.95.
In 1941 Dr. Wertham wrote Dark Legend: A Study In Murder, a non-
fiction novel concerning a case of matricide wherein he had extensively inter-
viewed and studied the murderer.
In 1949 he wrote The Show of Violence-A Psychiatrist Tells Why People
Kill And How Murder Can Be Prevented. He here discussed in some depth
several murderers he had examined. He preached concerning some of the sins
of society and outlined some of the problems of psychiatric testimony. He
also began to enlarge his scope to discuss murderers in literature and in
recent and remote history. He endeavored to find some pattern of behavior
and some clue as to prevention.
Numerous other writings of Dr. Wertham firmly establish him as an
expert on violence. On the dust jacket A Sign For Cain purports to be "the
first complete study of human violence." Not only does he undertake that
ambitious task, but he arrives at the double thesis that "on the one hand,
violence is becoming much more entrenched in our social life .... on the other
hand, it is within our power eventually to conquer and abolish it."'
To conquer violence, Dr. Wertham asserts, we must solve two major prob-
lems: First, we must continue the crusade against comic books and other mass
media as has been advocated by Dr. Wertham; and second, we must deal
with neo-Malthusian thinking.
Among the problems this reviewer has in accepting these points as major
issues in this "complete study of violence" is the use of what often seems tenuous
or irrelevant connections. Also troublesome is the use of a quotation from one
of Dr. Wertham's own legal reports as evidence of "truth."
1. P. 13.
